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Abstract. Cryptographic voting schemes strive to provide high assur-
ance of accuracy and secrecy with minimal trust assumptions, in particu-
lar, avoiding the need to trust software, hardware, suppliers, officials etc.
Ideally we would like to make a voting process as transparent as possi-
ble and so base out assurance purely on the vigilance of the electorate at
large, via suitable cryptographic algorithms and protocols. However, it is
important to recognize that election systems are above all socio-technical
systems: they must be usable by the electorate at large. As a result, it
may be necessary to trade-off technical perfection against simplicity and
usability. We illustrate this tension via design decisions in the Preˆt a`
Voter scheme.
1 Introduction
The trustworthiness of voting systems and technologies has received a high level
of media attention of late with problems occurring in, for example, the recent
US presidential elections and UK postal voting trials. Many of these problems
stem from the ‘black box’ nature of the systems, and the fact that they must be
trusted to function correctly and as intended.
Considerable progress has been made in the last few years in developing cryp-
tographic voting schemes. These typically provide impressive technical properties
such as ballot secrecy, universal verifiability (anyone can verify the correctness
of the outcome) and unconditional integrity (integrity is guaranteed without
requiring any computational assumptions). Whilst many of these are marvels
of the cryptographers craft, they are typically unsuitable for real elections, in
particular general elections. The subtle mathematical arguments justifying the
trustworthiness of such schemes are beyond the understanding of electorate at
large, even stretching the stretching the capabilities of trained mathematicians.
In addition, they often involve quite complex interactions between the users, i.e.
the voters and officials, and the system, and so are prone to error and “social
engineering” style attacks.
As with all “secure” systems, even a technically superb voting system may
be prone to failure due to human fallibility. For many secure systems we are
content to trust in security officers to bear much of the burden of maintaining
the system security. With voting systems, by contrast, our goal is to avoid the
need to place such trust in a small number of officials. Instead, we are seeking to
enable the voters to contribute to the trustworthiness of the system. Ideally we
would like the trust to reside solely with the electorate: “dependability by the
people for the people!” We thus have the rather paradoxical situation of wanting,
on the one hand, to make the voting ceremony as simple as possible, allowing
the voter to “vote and go” in the jargon, whilst, on the other, arranging for the
voters to play an active role in maintaining the dependability of the system.
We outline the goals and key features of a number of voting schemes and de-
scribe some of their system-based failures modes. I will then discuss attempts to
design schemes to take account of the role of the human users and strike the right
balance between technical and social enforcement of the security requirements.
2 Voter Verifiable Elections
A voting system is a highly adversarial system. Potentially, voters are trying
to cheat the system, the system is trying to cheat the voters, coercers and vote
buyers are trying to influence the voters and voters are trying to fool the coercers.
This last is a form of cheating is one that we want to encourage, or at least enable.
The ability to cheat the coercer means that any proof constructed by the voter
will not convince the coercer of how she voted. Ideally, we would like to develop
a system in which nobody has to trust anyone. More precisely, we would like the
trust ultimately to rest on the electorate themselves. Of course the electorate
could set up a large collusion to corrupt the system, but there would be little
point. Presumably, the outcome would be democratic anyway, as long as the
collusion set has the majority!
Significant progress has been made recently in the development of voting sys-
tems with remarkable technical properties such as universal verifiability, coercion-
resistance, minimal and dependence on system components. Some of these treat
the problem as a special case of the problem of distributed, secure computation,
and as such, involve some fairly forbidding mathematics, and tend not to scale
well.
A rather different approach, exemplified by the voter-verifiable schemes of
Chaum [2] and Neff [5], [6] and Preˆt a` Voter [3], strives toward schemes that,
whilst achieving similar goals, are more practical and accessible. These provide
the voter with an encrypted receipt which the voter can later use to check that
their receipt is entered into the decryption/tabulation phase via a secure web
bulletin board. However, all of these schemes harbour certain system-based vul-
nerabilities. Karlof et al have identified some of these vulnerabilities in an anal-
ysis of the Chaum and Neff schemes [4]. Ryan et al have carried out a similar
analysis on Preˆt a` Voter [9]. Some of these can be thought of as “social engineer-
ing” style attacks, in which the vote capture device induces the voter to follow
the protocol steps in an altered sequence. For example, the “cut-and-choose” el-
ement of the protocol could potentially be turned into a “choose-and-cut”, thus
allowing vote corruption to go undetected. Alternatively, the device could feign
an abort if the voter makes the “wrong” choice and repeat the protocol until the
voter gets it “right”.
Of course, alert voters with a good appreciation of the rational for the mech-
anisms involved in the voting protocol would presumably detect and report at-
tempts by the device to deviate from the proper running of the protocol. Unfor-
tunately it is not clear how much we could rely on such vigilance on the part of
the voters.
We can illustrate the tension between trying to make the voter experience as
simple as possible on the one hand, whilst trying on the other to minimize the
system-based vulnerabilities, by reference to a design choice in the Preˆt a` Voter.
The key innovation of the Preˆt a` Voter scheme is to use ballot forms for which the
candidate order is randomized. Information allowing the tellers to reconstruct
the permutation, and hence extract the vote value, is buried cryptographically
on the ballot forms. In effect, the frame of reference in which the vote is encoded
is randomized. Consequently, there is no need to directly encrypt the voters
selection and, hence, no need for the vote capture device to learn the voters
selection.
Democritus
Plato
Socrates
Thales
7rJ94K
Fig. 1. A typical Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
In the polling station, the voter selects a ballot form at random (in practice
these would be kept in sealed envelopes). In the booth, the voter extracts the
form, makes their mark against their choice of candidate, and then removes
and discards the left hand column that carries the candidate list. This leaves a
receipt of the form shown in figure 2, which in this instance encodes a vote for
Democritus.
X
7rJ94K
Fig. 2. A Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt
It is essential for the accuracy of the tabulation to ensure that, for each bal-
lot form, the cryptographic values accurately reflect the candidate permutation
shown on the form. An example is shown in Figure 1 below. In the original
Preˆt a` Voter [8], checking the well-formedness of the ballot forms is achieved
using a “cut-and-choose” mechanism. In essence two permutations along with
corresponding crypto values are given per ballot form. The voter makes a ran-
dom choice with which to cast their vote. The permutation against which the
voter makes their mark is destroyed, whilst the unused one is preserved, and
can subsequently be used to check that the permutation is correct. An alter-
native approach, adopted in the later version of Preˆt a` Voter [3], is to use a
single permutation on each (pre-printed) ballot form, and use random audits of
these forms to detect any attempts to decouple the candidate permutations and
crypto values. In essence, the “cut-and-choose” element is separated out from
the vote casting protocol and is performed by independent auditing authorities
in advance, rather than by the voters themselves.
The first approach of [8], which is closer in spirit to Chaum’s original scheme,
enables “on demand” creation of ballot material and does not depend on as-
sumptions about the probity of the authorities, or procedures in performing the
random audits. It is however more vulnerable to the social engineering-style at-
tacks mentioned earlier, depends the voters making unpredictable choices during
the vote casting protocol, and being reasonably diligent in checking their forms.
An example of the kind of social-engineering attack that might occur in such
a scheme is for the device to fool the voter about the sequence of interactions. If
the device can predict which side the voter will choose to cast their and vote and
which will be audited then the purpose of the cut-and-choose is undermined.
All of this might suggest that the most robust implementation is to combine
the two approaches. In fact, this doesn’t quite work out: whilst we do get the
best of both approaches we also get the worst. In particular we have the problem
that the pre-auditing approach requires prior commitment to the ballot mate-
rial which is also opens up certain system-based vulnerabilities, such as chain
of custody issues and chain-voting [7]. In the chain-voting attack, an outsider
obtains an unused ballot form, marks his vote choice and persuades a voter to
cast it at the polling station. If the voter returns with a fresh ballot form, the
process can be repeated with another voter.
A possible approach is to use a two sided, three column ballot form:
Democritus —————-
Plato —————-
Socrates —————-
Thales —————-
7rJ94K —————-
Fig. 3. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form; side 1
Figure 3 shows one side of such a dual ballot form, whilst figure 4 shows
the flip side, side 2. These two sides should be thought of as rotated around
a vertical axis. Note that each side has an independent randomization of the
Democritus —————-
Thales —————-
Plato —————-
Socrates —————-
Y u78gf —————-
Fig. 4. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form; side 2
candidate order along with the corresponding cryptographic values. Thus each
side carries an independent Preˆt a` Voter ballot form.
The voter uses only one side to encode their vote and makes an arbitrary
choice between the sides. Suppose that the voter in this case chooses what we
are referring to as side 2 and wants to cast a vote for Thales. They place an
X against Thales on side 2 and then destroy the left hand strip that shows the
candidate order for side 2. This results in a ballot receipt of the form:
Democritus
Plato
Socrates
Thales
7rJ94K
Fig. 5. Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt; auditable side
—————-
X —————-
—————-
—————-
Y u78gf —————-
Fig. 6. Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt; vote encoding side
The voter’s choice is now encoded on side 2 of the receipt. Notice that de-
stroying the left hand column of the chosen side destroyed the blank column of
the flip, audit side leaving the candidate order intact. The audit side does not
contain any information about the voter’s selection but the candidate order is
still visible along with the corresponding crypto value. Since the permutations
of the candidate list on the two sides are wholly independent the voter’s mark
on one side is unrelated to the candidate order shown on the other.
At the time of casting the vote, the information on both sides of the resulting
receipt is recorded and, after the close of polls, would be posted to the WBB.
Whilst the information on the flip side conveys nothing about the voter choice, it
can be used to check the well-formedness of (the unused side of) the ballot form.
For this, the auditors require the seed value for the audit side to be revealed
and recompute the encryption and candidate order. It can then be checked that
these recomputed values agree with those shown on the form. Mechanisms are
needed to prevent the seeds for voted sides being revealed. These are a topic for
future investigation.
This is very close in spirit to Chaum’s original scheme but with the extra
feature that we are now introducing the idea of well-formedness checks on the
material on the WBB. This was actually possible in Chaum’s original scheme
but seems not to have been proposed. Chaum’s scheme proposed the idea of
voters using checking devices provided by independent authorities on the way
out of the polling station. The same could also be done here of course as an extra
layer of security and a way to pick up problems earlier.
This scheme has the appealing feature that the two sides are essentially
equivalent and hence there should be no voter bias between them. Given that
we have the cut-and-choose protocol with post-auditing, such ballot forms could
be printed on demand in the booth. Any attempt by the device to corrupt
votes by incorrectly printing the forms would with high probability be detected.
The downside is that it is important that the voters understand the process
sufficiently. For example, it is essential that the device not be able to influence
or predict the voter’s choice of side with which to encode their vote. It is also
important that they appreciate that they should only mark the chosen side and
that the LH strip of the chosen side should be destroyed. Strictly speaking, any
mark on the unused side should not matter, nothing will be counted from this
side, but there may be psychological implications for the voters.
It may be possible to automate the above protocol or enforce it procedurally
but of course this would require transferring trust to the devices or processes
that perform the enforcement.
3 Conclusion
In [1], Anderson shows that cryptographic systems typically fail not due to tech-
nical failures but as a result of crude system-based failures. This observation is, if
anything, even more valid when applied to voting systems. They are required to
be usable by the entire electorate. Furthermore they are used only infrequently
so we can we assume little in terms of user familiarity and understanding. On
the other hand, we would like the trustworthiness of our voting system to rest
ultimately on the electorate.
We have illustrated this tension with a concrete example of a design decision
that arises in exploring possible implementations of the Preˆt a` Voter concept.
On the one hand we could opt for a design that makes the voter experience very
simple and familiar but requires some degree of trust in the authorities that
perform the random audits of the ballot forms. On the other hand, we gave an
implementation that removes the need for such trust, the voters perform the
auditing, but at the cost of making the voting experience slightly more complex:
the voters have to make an arbitrary choice between sides of the form etc. Either
choice has its dangers: in the first the first a large scale collusion of auditors
could undermine the integrity of the election along with the problems of chain
of custody of pre-printed forms. In the second, the danger is that voters may not
be sufficiently aware of the security mechanisms and so may be prey to social
engineering style attacks.
Thus, in designing voting systems for “real” use, it is essential that account
be taken of the role of the human. It is often claimed that the users are the
weakest link in a secure systems defenses. All too often this is true, but in the
context of voting systems, we are seeking to make the users the bedrock on
which the assurance rests. A delicate balance must be struck between making
the voters role as simple as possible whilst enabling the voters to contribute the
overall dependability of the system.
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